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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
CLARENCE L. JOLLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
By its amended complaint

(R. 2-9), the plaintiff

alleged that on or about the 24th day of June,

1971,

Defendant entered into three lease agreements with the
Plaintiff, by which the Plaintiff leased to the Defendant
three automobiles, rental payments to be made on a monthly
basis.

Plaintiff also alleged that on or about the 24th

day of June,

1971, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into

another contract by which Defendant agreed to purchase
the three automobiles for the sum of $10,000.00 after the
expiration of one year.

Plaintiff also alleged that under

the contract, Defendant assigned to Plaintiff certain
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shares of stock, and that Defendant agreed to have the
stock made free trading on or before the one year expiration date, at which time the Plaintiff would be able to
sell the shares.

The Plaintiff also alleged that the

contract provided that when the stock was sold, the
Plaintiff would apply the proceeds of the sale to the
rental due under the terms of the leases and the balance
toward the purchase price.

Plaintiff also alleged that

in the event the sale price of the securities was less
than the amount required to pay the lease and to complete
the purchase price, the Defendant had the option to pay
the balance and obtain title to the automobiles or return
the cars to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff alleged that the

Plaintiff was entitled to the excess of the proceeds of
the sale, if any.

Finally, the Plaintiff alleged that the

Defendant had breached the contract in that Defendant had
not made the stock free trading.
By his answer and counterclaim and affirmative

defense (R. 10-13), the Defendant admitted that the
Defendant and Plaintiff had entered into the tnree leases
and a sales contract.

As an affirmative defense, the

Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff was estopped from
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asserting breach of contract because the Plaintiff voluntarily took upon

itself the responsibility to free up

the stock, leading the Defendant to believe that he had
no further obligation under the contract, and thereby
waiving the provision in the contract requiring the
Defendant to free up the stock.

The Defendant in his

prayer requested that the court give to the Defendant
clear and free title to the three automobiles, and that
the Court grant to the Defendant all sums which Plaintiff
could have obtained had it diligently and properly pursued
the freeing up of the stock, in excess of the purchase
price of the automobiles.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter came up for trial before the Honorable
Earnest F. Baldwin on May 6, 1977.

After the trial, the

Court awarded the Plaintiff judgment in the amount of
$10,608.55, and dismissed the Defendant's counterclaim
with prejudice.

(R. 41-42)

In its findings of fact, the

trial court found that the Defendant did not register
the shares of stock, did not receive an opinion
from company counsel that registration was not required,
and did not otherwise make the stock freely tradeable
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-4as required by the contract
of fact,

(R. 39).

From this finding

the court concluded that the Defendant had breached

the contract with the Plaintiff.

(R. 39)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the following relief on appeal:
1.

A determination by the Court that a finding

of fact should be entered that the Plaintiff voluntarily
took upon itself the obligation to free up the stock,
leading the Defendant to reasonably believe that he no
longer had any responsibility under the agreement, and that
the Defendant relied thereon, reasonably believing that the
Plaintiff would free up the stock itself.
2.

A determination by the Court that because of

the Plaintiff's actions in taking upon itself the responsibility of freeing up the stock, the Plaintiff waived the
Defendant's obligation under the contract, and that the
Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting that the
Defendant breached the contract for failure to free up the
stock.
3.

A determination by the Court that the trial

court committed error in allowing the Plaintiff's expert
witnesses to testify concerning whether the stock could be
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-5freed up, while refusing to allow the Defendant's expert
witness to testify on the same matter.
4.

A determination by the Court that the trial

court applied erroneous law in regard to freeing up of
stock during the course and proceedings of the trial and
that its findings of fact and conclusions of law were
prejudiced thereby.
5.

As an alternative to the relief requested in

paragraphs number 1 and 2, a determination by the Court that
a new trial be granted because of the reversible errors
committed by the trial court as described in paragraphs
numbers 3 - 4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At the trial, the Defendant testified that he had

a telephone conversation with Newman Petty, President of
the Plaintiff Corporation, and that during the course of
the conversation, Mr. Petty told him that he would prefer
to have his own attorney provide an opinion in regard to
freeing up the stock and that Defendant replied that this
arrangement would be fine with him.

(Transcript 69.)

Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake Attorney, testified that the
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Defendant had come to him,
stock.

requesting that he free up the

Mr. Dodd testified that he started to do research

on the problem, but after two or three weeks received a
phone call from the Defendant requesting that he spend no
more time on the problem because Mr. Petty had decided to
retain his own lawyer to issue an opinion to free up the
(Transcript 64.)

stock.
2.

At the trial, there was exhaustive evidence

that the Plaintiff went to extensive effort to free up the
stock by itself:
a.

Mr. Petty testified that before May or June

of 1973, he contacted Thomas Blomquist, Counsel for the
Corporation which had issued the stock, and talked to him
several times about the freeing up of the stock.

During

the course of their conversations, Mr. Blomquist suggested
that Mr. Petty call a certain attorney in California and
ask him about the freeing up of the stock.

(Transcript

13 - 14.)
b.

Mr. Petty testified that he called this

attorney in California, but was told that the attorney
would object to freeing up the stock and would not give a
letter of recommendation on it.

(Transcript 14.)
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c.

Mr. Petty testified that after his communi-

cation with the attorney in California, he contacted
Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake Attorney, requesting that Mr.
Byrd undertake to free up the stock, and that Mr. Byrd
subsequently investigated the matter.
d.

(Transcript 14.)

Mr. Petty testified that he had at least

two more conversations with Mr. Blomquist, asking him to
do whatever was necessary to free up the stock, but that
Mr. Blomquist had told him that it couldn't be done and
that the company would object to it.
e.

(Transcript 15.)

Richard Byrd testified that he was con-

tacted by Mr. Petty who requested him to free up the stock.
Mr. Byrd testified that Mr. Petty provided him with copies
of the stock certificates, and sent him a letter including
copies of the agreements entered into between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant.

Mr. Byrd also testified that he had had

various conversations and communications with Mr. Petty
in regard to the freeing up of the stock.

(Transcript

28 - 31.)

f.

Thomas Blomquist, Attorney for the company

which issued the stock, teqtified that Mr. Petty had contacted him, requesting his opinion as to whether the stock
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could be freed up.
3.

(Transcript 43.)

The contract specified that the Defendant was

to have the stock freed up by June 23, 1972.

(Exhibits

1-P, 1-P (A), 1-P (B), 1-P (C)) .
4.

Mr. Petty testified that he was busy trying to

get the stock freed up himself as late as May or June of
1973.

(Transcript 13.)
5.

Mr. Petty testified that he had had several

conversations with the Defendant wherein Mr. Petty expressed
his concern

bec~use

the stock had not been freed up.

Mr.

Petty testified that he told the Defendant that it was the
Defendant's responsibility to free up the stock.

(Transcript

12 - 13.)
6.

At the trial, Mr. Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake

attorney, was called as a witness by the Plaintiff and was
allowed to testify concerning whether the stock could have
been freed up.
7.

(Transcript 29 - 30.)

At the trial, Mr. Thomas Blomquist, an attorney,

was called as a witness by the Plaintiff and was allowed to
testify as to the law of freeing up of stock, expressing his
opinion to the court that the stock could not have been
freed up.

(Transcript 48 - 50.)

Counsel for the Defendant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

L

-9made strenuou3 objection to the introduction of this
evidence.
8.

(Transcript 45 - 47.)
After the testimony of Thomas Blomquist, the

court made the comment that " .... it is crystal clear to
me this stock was not and could not at this stage become
free trading."
9.

(Transcript 53.)

At the trial, Counsel for the Defendant called

to the witness stand, Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake Attorney,

fo

ask his opinion as to whether the stock could have been
freed up.

(Transcript 64.)

At this point, the Attorney

for the Plaintiff objected to the introduction of this
evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant because
" .•.. the restrictive legend in the certificate requires
an opinion of corporate counsel,
attorney."

(Transcript 64.)

jection without comment.

not of some independent

The Court sustained the ob-

(Transcript 64.)

The Attorney

for the Defendant then made an offer of proof that Mr.
Dodd would have testified that he could have issued an
opinion that the stock could have been freed up.

(Trans-

cript 65.)
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POINT I.
THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT ENTERING A FINDING OF FACT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF TOOK UPON HIMSELF THE OBLIGATION TO FREEUP THE STOCK, LEADING THE DEFENDANT TO REASONABLY
BELIEVE THAT HE NO LONGER HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER THE AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT RELIED
THEREON, REASONABLY BELIEVING THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD
FREE UP THE STOCK ITSELF:
The basic rule of appellate review is that a presumption arises that the judgment is sound, and the appellate
court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party.
465 P.2d 534

Branel v. Utah State Road Commission,

(Utah, 1970); Rivas v Pacific Finance Company,

397 P.2d 990 (Utah, 1964).

However, under some circumstances

this presumption can be overcome.

In Hardy v. Hendrickson,

495 P.2d 28, 29, this Court stated:
On appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to sustain the lower court, and the findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
against the weight of the evidence ..•.
Also, in Branel, supra at 535-536, this Court stated:
The Foundational Rule on this aspect of procedure
is that it is the trial judge's prerogative to find
the facts; and this includes judging the credibility
of the witnesses and the evidence and drawing whatever
reasonable inferences may fairly be derived therefrom.
It is therefor more accurate to say that on review we
survey
the evidence in the light favorable to the
findings, whichever party they may favor; and that
they will not be disturbed on appeal if they are
supported by substantial evidence.
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It is apparent from the foregoing rules of law that
the Supreme Court of Utah will find a trial courts finding
of facts to be erroneous if it can be shown that the weight
of evidence is clearly against the findings; or if it can
be shown that there is no substantial evidence to support
them.

In the instant case, a survey of the record indicates

that the weight of evidence is clearly against the findings
of fact, and that in relationship to the weight of the
evidence, there is no substantial evidence to support the
findings of fact the way they presently stand.
The vast weight of the evidence clearly shows that
the Plaintiff took upon himself the obligation and the
responsibility to free up the stock and that the Defendant
relied upon this assumption of responsibility on the part
of the Plaintiff, and thereafter reasonably believed that
his obligation under the contract to free up the stock had
been extinguished.

The Defendant testified that Newman

Petty, President of the Plaintiff Corporation, specifically
told him that he would assume this responsibility.

Graham

Dodd, a Salt Lake attorney, testified that the Defendant
came to him, requesting that he endeavor to free up the
stock, but that subsequently the Defendant requested that
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-12he discontinue his work on the problem for the reason
that Mr. Petty had decided to retain his own lawyer to
issue an opinion to free up the stock.

There was ex-

haustive evidence during the course of the trial that
the Plaintiff went to extensive effort
stock by itself.

~o

free up the

The evidence showed that Mr. Petty con-

tacted three different lawyers in regard to the matter
and had many communications and conversations with each
attorney.

One of the attorneys, Richard Byrd, verified

the fact that the Plaintiff was busy trying to free up
the stock itself by testifying that Mr. Petty came to him
with stock certificates and copies of various documents
requesting that he help him free up the stock.

Another

attorney, Thomas Blomquist, testified that Mr. Petty contacted him many times in regard to the matter.

The only

evidence whatsoever in the record that contradicts the
above evidence is the uncorroborated testimony of Mr.
Petty that he told the Defendant that it was his responsibility to free up the stock.

In light of the great weight

of evidence showing that the Plaintiff had assumed the
responsibility to free up the stock,

it cannot be said

that this uncorroborated testimony by Mr. Petty is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact by the
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trial court.
It is true, of course, that it is the trial court's
prerogative to judge the credibility of witnesses, and
the Appellate Court is usually bound by the trial court's
determination of the issue of credibility.

Thus, it might

be argued that the trial court simply decided that the
testimony in favor of the Defendant's position was not
credible, and that the testimony in favor of the Plaintiff
was credible.

However, if this position is accepted by

the instant Court, then a serious problem arises.

This is

because Mr. Petty's testimony is contradictory in and of
itself.

First of all, Mr. Petty testified that he specifi-

cally told the Defendant that it was his responsibility to
free up the stock.

Then, subsequently, Mr. Petty elaborately

described the many efforts that he underwent himself to free
up the stock.

Thus, Mr. Petty's testimony as to the exten-

sive efforts he underwent to free up the stock, clearly
belies his testimony that he had not assumed the responsibility for freeing up the stock.

The findings of fact, there-

fore, must be based on a very curious determination of
credibility by the trial court.

The trial court must have

determined that Mr. Petty was telling the truth insofar as
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-14his testimony related to his allegation that he had not
assumed the responsibility for freeing up the stock, but
disbelieved his testimony insofar as it related to the
extensive efforts undergone by himself to free up the
stock.

Thus, the trial court's determination of this issue

is specious at best.

Because of this irregularity, it

cannot be said that the findings of fact are "supported
by substantial evidence", and it is apparent that the
findings of fact are "clearly against the weight of evidence."
POINT II.
UNDER UTAH LAW, A PARTY TO A CONTRACT, THROUGH HIS
WORDS, ACTS, OR CONDUCT, CAN EFFECTIVELY WAIVE AN
OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONTRACT OWED TO HIM BY THE
OTHER PARTY.
This Court, in Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc.,

348

P. 2d 337, 339 (Utah, 1960), stated:
It is a well established rule of law that parties
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract
designed to hamper such freedom.
The Court, in articulating this rule of law, stated
in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Company, 146 P. 2d 284, 287
(Utah, 1944):
Where one by his conduct has caused the other to
believe that he has waived a provision which was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15placed there for his benefit, and considers the
contract in full force and effect, common honesty
between men requires that, if he subsequently
desires to enforce the provision, reasonable time
must be given the other party to comply with the
terms of the contract.
It is apparent from the foregoing language by the
Supreme Court of Utah that the principal of waiver applies
in the contract situation, and that a party may waive a
provision in a contract which was for his benefit.

In the

instant case, it is apparent that the Plaintiff waived the
provision in the contract requiring the defendant to free
up the stock within a year after the three lease agreements
were entered into, taking upon itself the responsibility to
do so.

Three things lead to this conclusion.

First, the

evidence at the trial showed that Mr. Petty himself went to
exhaustive and extensive efforts to free up the stock.
Secondly, the Defendant testified that Plaintiff released him
from the obligation.

Thirdly, Mr. Petty obviously had waived

the provision in the contract, because even as late as one
year after the date upon which Defendant's "obligation" to
free up the stock had matured, Mr. Petty was still busy talking to attorneys and trying to get the stock freed up himself.
The Plaintiff, therefore, cannot now complain that the
Defendant failed to execute this term of the contract, and
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-16the Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting breach of
contract.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES TO TESTIFY
CONCERNING WHETHER THE STOCK COULD HAVE BEEN MADE
FREELY TRADEABLE, WHILE NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT'S
EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY ON THE SAME MATTER.
At the trial, the court allowed the Plaintiff to
introduce evidence concerning whether the stock could have
been made freely tradeable.

Richard Byrd, a Salt Lake

attorney, testified concerning this matter and Thomas
Blomquist, despite objections of the Defendant, was allowed
to give his opinion that the stock could not have been
freed up.

The court refused to allow the Defendant's

witness, Graham Dodd, a Salt Lake attorney, to give his
opinion that the stock could have been freed up.
This appears to have been an abuse of judicial
discretion, since the question of whether stock may become
freely tradeable is a question of fact.

A corporation's

refusal to free up stock may be wrongful depending upon the
facts of the case.

See Melville v. wantschek, 403 F.Supp.

439 (E.D.N.Y., 1975); Travis Investment Co. v. Harwyn
Publishing Corporation, 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y., 1968).
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In Travis Investment Co., supra at 527, the court recognized
that refusal to transfer certificates without justification
was wrongful:
Therefore, plaintiff has not proved that Harwyn's
refusal to transfer the shares was wrongful and in
violation of its duty to plaintiff; and Harwyn
has established that its refusal to transfer the
shares ... was reasonable.
After the testimony of Mr. Blomquist was concluded,
the court then made the comment: "I think it is crystal
clear to me this stock was not and could not at this
stage become free trading."

Obviously, the court's

conclusion was unjustified because it had not allowed
the Defendant's witness to testify on this matter.
The court's conclusion also was prejudicial
the outcome

because

of the case could have been conceivably

different if the court would have believed that the stock
could have been made freely tradeable.

It is evident

that if the court believed that the stock could not have
been freed up, then the question of waiver on the part of
plaintiff

would

court's consideration.

not have been relevant to the
Thus, the court might have

disregarded competent evidence on the question of waiver
and estoppel simply because it did not feel it relevant.
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LORIN N. PACE
RANDALL BUNNELL
431 South Third East, B-1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT to Wayne G. Petty of Moyle
and Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, this 23d day of
January 1978, postage prepaid.

RANDALL BUNNELL
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